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Beyond Options
Anthony J. Casey and Edward R. Morrison*
Scholars and policymakers now debate reforms that would prevent a
bankruptcy filing from being a moment that forces valuation of the firm,
crystallization of claims against it, and elimination of junior stakeholders’
interest in future appreciation in firm value. These reforms have many names,
ranging from Relative Priority to Redemption Option Value. Much of the
debate centers on the extent to which reform would protect the nonbankruptcy options of junior stakeholders, or harm the non-bankruptcy
options of senior lenders. We argue that this focus on options misplaced.
Protecting options is neither necessary nor sufficient for advancing the goal of
a well-functioning bankruptcy system. What is needed is a regime that cashes
out the rights of junior stakeholders with minimal judicial involvement. To
illustrate, we propose an “automatic bankruptcy procedure” that gives senior
creditors an option to restructure the firm’s debt or sell its assets at any time
after a contractual default. Under this procedure, restructuring occurs in
bankruptcy, but sales do not. Sales are either subject to warrants (which give
junior stakeholders a claim on future appreciation) or are subject to judicial
appraisal (which forces senior lenders to compensate junior stakeholders if the
sale price was too low). Our proposal can be seen as an effort to design a
formalized restructuring procedure that borrows from traditional state law
governing corporate-control transactions. We show that this procedure
minimizes core problems of current law—fire sales that harm junior
stakeholders, delay that harms senior lenders, and the uncertainties generated
by judicial valuation, which are exploited by all parties.

University of Chicago and Columbia University. We thank Barry Adler and Richard
Squire for their help. We are grateful for generous financial support from the Richard
Weil Faculty Research Fund and The Paul H. Leffmann Fund (Casey) and the Charles
Evans Gerber Transactional Studies Program Fund (Morrison).
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Introduction
For many decades it has been well understood that options are embedded
within the debt and equity issued by a corporation. Equity is implicitly a call
option on the firm’s assets, with a strike price equal to the firm’s liabilities.1
Senior (secured) debt is equivalent to owning the firm’s assets and selling a call
option with a strike price equal to the face value of the senior debt. And
unsecured debt is a combination of two options—a long call option on the firm’s
assets, with a strike price equal to senior debt, plus a short call option, entitling
equityholders to buy the assets from unsecured creditors at a price equal to total
firm liabilities.
Under current law, a bankruptcy filing is analogous to a common expiration
date – imposed by law – for all options embedded within the firm’s securities.2
All debts come due and the present value of the firm is distributed as if the firm
were being liquidated. By function of the Bankruptcy Code’s absolute priority
rule (APR) – which forbids payouts of any kind to junior creditors3 when senior
creditors have not be paid in full – the distribution collapses all future
possibilities and effectively destroys the options held by junior creditors and
equityholders. They must exercise their options immediately or lose them
forever.
This options-based perspective highlights the extent to which the Code
implicitly impairs junior stakeholders’ options during the bankruptcy process. It
also highlights the extent to which the bankruptcy process itself creates new
options.4 Because confirmation takes time and asset values are volatile, the value
of the bankruptcy estate can change substantially between filing and plan
confirmation. For junior stakeholders, this volatility creates a payoff profile
identical to the payoffs from a call option. As with any option, the longer the
time until the option expires (the delay from filing to confirmation), the greater

Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. Pol.
Econ. 637 (1973); Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of
Interest Rates, 29 J.Fin. 449 (1974).
2
Bo Huang, Absolute Priority Rule and Option Theory, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1930404 (2011).
3 Following convention, for most of this article we refer to equity and other classes of
junior creditors interchangeably.
4 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J. L.
Econ. & Org. 356 (2001) (modeling the decision-making of the bankruptcy judge using
real-options theory).
1
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the option value. Moreover, the firm’s value at confirmation is determined by a
judge, not the market. The greater the variance in judicial valuation, the greater
the option value created by a process that relies on that valuation. 5
These insights have prompted recent reevaluation of the APR. The central
goals of a well-functioning bankruptcy system include minimizing the
deadweight costs of financial distress and maximizing creditor recoveries. Both
goals reduce costs of capital ex ante. The focus on options reveals that current
bankruptcy law preserves and destroys options in ways that can increase the
costs of financial distress and permit some creditors to benefit at the expense of
others. Because the APR causes the expiration of all junior-creditor options, for
example, it creates an incentive for junior creditors to agitate for a lengthier
bankruptcy proceeding, especially a reorganization, which exposes the parties to
greater judicial variance. For the same reason, the APR induces secured creditors
to push for quick sales, even at fire-sale prices.
Recent scholarship has advocated reforms that unwind these adverse effects.
For example, scholars have advocated a return to “relative priority,” requiring
senior lenders to buy out the options of junior lenders when seniors advocate a
quick sale, or at least to compensate the junior lenders for the value of those
options.6 The primary goal of a “relative priority” regime is to preserve, as much
as possible, the options held by creditors outside bankruptcy. A bankruptcy
filing would no longer represent a common expiration date for options.7 Instead,
Senior and junior creditors can change the value of these bankruptcy options by filing
sale motions (speeding up the case, thereby reducing option value) or demanding
judicial valuation prior to cramdown (slowing down the case, increasing option value).
Anthony J. Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option Preservation Priority in Chapter 11, 78
U.Chi. L. Rev. 759 (2011). Incentives to engage in such strategic behavior will depend on
the expected volatility in asset values during the reorganization period and the variance
inherent in the judicial valuation of the firm’s assets (“appraisal variance”). Douglas G.
Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the
Reorganization Bargain, 115 Yale L. J. 1930, 1937 (2006).
6 See Douglas G. Baird and Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty,
and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 Yale L. J. 1930 (2006); Casey supra note __; Melissa
Jacoby and Edward Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy, 123 Yale L. J. 862 (2013); American Bankruptcy Institute Commission to
Study the Reform of Chapter 11, Final Report and Recommendations (2015) (hereinafter,
“ABI Commission Report”).
7 For a lucid exploration of how a relative priority regime would work, see Douglas G.
Baird, Bankruptcy’s Lost Paradigm, working paper (2015).
5
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junior creditors and investors would retain options allowing them to capture
future appreciation in firm value, if the debtor is reorganized. If the debtor is
instead sold off, they might (depending on the specific proposal) retain the right
to compensation for the value of these options, which are extinguished by the
sale.
These proposals make sense if our primary concern is the APR and its
degrading effect on the options of junior creditors. This concern, we argue here,
is too narrow. It ignores the many other options that are altered by bankruptcy
proceedings. For example, valuable real options held by senior creditors are
impaired both by the bankruptcy code’s automatic stay and its lien stripping
rules. Equally important, the focus on junior creditors’ options exalts options for
options sake without considering whether or not protecting those options is
necessary for advancing the goals of a well functioning bankruptcy system.
We argue here that protecting options is, ultimately, neither necessary nor
sufficient for that purpose. What is necessary and sufficient is a regime that
cashes out the rights of junior investors (creditors and equityholders) at market
prices. To illustrate, we propose an “automatic bankruptcy procedure” that gives
senior creditors an option to restructure the firm’s debt or sell its assets at any
time after a default, with or without a bankruptcy filing. If the option is
exercised, the senior creditor must choose between two types of restructurings.
One is to sell the firm’s assets free and clear of all interests but allow junior
creditors and equityholders to demand an appraisal, which guarantees that they
receive no less than they would have received from the going-concern value in a
reorganization. Alternatively, the senior creditor can sell the firm subject to
warrant-like instruments that are distributed to all creditors and equityholders
who are not paid in full on the sale date. These instruments ensure that these
junior stakeholders benefit from future appreciation in the value of the assets.
The warrants would have a strike price equal to the face value of the senior
claims and an expiration date set at somewhere around 5 or 10 years after the
restructuring date.
The most important feature of this mechanism is that no judicial intervention
would be needed to implement our procedure. To be sure, judicial involvement
is needed if creditors or shareholders demand an appraisal. But this remedy is no
different from the one available to minority shareholders in any corporate
control transaction. Indeed, our proposal can be seen as an effort to design a
formalized restructuring procedure that borrows from traditional state law
governing corporate-control transactions.
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Our proposal also draws on prior work by Adler. Like Adler, we advocate a
procedure that automatically adjusts the firm’s capital structure. But the trigger
for adjustment is not the advent of distress, as in Adler’s proposal. It is instead
the decision of the senior lender to exercise an option.
1. Options In and Out of Bankruptcy
1.1 Non-Bankruptcy Options in the Shadow of Bankruptcy
Every firm is a collection of assets with uncertain future cash flows. The
volatility of those cash flows generates option value for junior creditors and
shareholders: if the firm thrives, they enjoy cash flows; if the firm fails and merits
liquidation, they can leave the firm to the senior creditors and walk away. The
greater the uncertainty about future cash flows, the more valuable the option
becomes.
Outside bankruptcy, this option is constrained by the senior creditor’s right
(also an option) to demand an immediate liquidation in the event of default. The
senior creditor has the right to capture the value it can recover in a foreclosure
sale. Thus, a default on senior debt accelerates the maturity of junior investors’
options. Of course, if the senior creditor wants to keep the firm alive – to recover
something more than foreclosure value – it must negotiate with junior creditors,
who otherwise have the option to obtain and enforce judgment liens.8
The problem is that such bargaining is, with large enterprises,9 often
impossible. A firm might have thousands of creditors (some identifiable and
some not) with different (and unknown) incentives with regard to the future of
the firm. Moreover, their incentives to maximize their individual returns create a
classic common pool where creditors fail to coordinate action, race to the assets,
and destroy the value of the estate for all stakeholders.
Bankruptcy law is intended to solve this problem by forcing creditors to
forebear their rights and enter a collective bargaining process. The driving theory
behind all of this is that bankruptcy should be “designed to mirror the agreement
one would expect the creditors to form among themselves were they to negotiate

Casey, supra, at 775-77.
It is sometimes possible with smaller enterprises, as discussed in Edward R. Morrison,
Bargaining around Bankruptcy: Small Business Distress and State Law, 38 J. Legal Stud. 255
(2009).
8
9
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such an agreement from an ex ante position.”10 And – somewhat obviously – that
hypothetical ex ante agreement cannot be known with certainty but it is assumed
to be the one that maximizes collective value for all stakeholders.
This raises a key point: In the absence of bankruptcy law, the fate of a firm
after default would depend on the ex ante agreements the senior and junior
creditors have negotiated and their ex post decisions with regard to enforcing
those agreements. But we don’t know what rights the creditors would have
bargained for in such a world. And even if senior creditors had bargained for the
right—on paper—to accelerate the loan and liquidate the firm’s assets, whether
they would exercise that option would depend on further negotiations with
other creditors. Put differently, we can read and re-read acceleration clauses into
eternity and still have no clue how creditors would respond to the firm’s default
in a world that has no bankruptcy rules and no bargaining costs because we
don’t live in that world.11 In a world with bankruptcy, the terms of existing
lending contracts are not only uninformative, but may even be socially
inefficient.12
Because the terms of existing contracts tell us little if anything about
negotiations (efficient or otherwise) in a world without the current bankruptcy
code, it is surprising that some scholars, including Adler and Triantis in their
contribution to this volume, implicitly assume that no negotiation would occur
and contracts (as they are written today) would be enforced mechanically
according to their terms. What’s the sense in that? This amounts to assuming
away the very problem that bankruptcy law is trying to solve. Bankruptcy law
should construct (or get as close as possible to) the counterfactual bargain that
would have been struck by creditors in a world of complete contracts and no
transaction costs – the bargain that maximizes the value of the estate as a whole
and minimizes costs of credit ex ante. Even Adler and Triantis agree with this
proposition. Yet their assumption runs contrary to the fundamental point. For
example, non-bankruptcy liquidation values are often much lower than the value

See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy,Non-bankruptcy Entitlements,and the Creditors'
Bargain,91 Yale L. J. 857, 860 (1982).
10

The range of potential post-default outcomes is vast (as most recently noted by Baird).
Douglas G. Baird, The Rights of Secured Creditors After Rescap, 2015 Univ. Ill. L. Rev. 849,
853.
12 See, e.g., Kenneth M. Ayotte, “On the Mandatory Stay of Secured Creditors in
Bankruptcy,” working paper (2016)
11
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that can be recovered through a going concern sale in bankruptcy. That is
precisely why many senior creditors cooperate with or push for a bankruptcy
filing in order to achieve a free-and-clear sale rather than exercising their
foreclosure rights outside of bankruptcy.13 Why, then, should we assume that
those same creditors would bargain for a right to accelerate their loans in
bankruptcy even if doing so destroys estate value?
A simple example can demonstrate the point. Imagine the debtor has two
assets, A & B. Secured Creditor A is owed $100 and has a security interest in
asset A. Secured Creditor B is owed $100 and has an interest in asset B. Debtor
also has several unsecured creditors. Assets A and B can be sold in a foreclosure
sale for $50 each, but the firm can be sold in bankruptcy for $210. What are
Secured Creditor A’s contractual rights outside of bankruptcy? The only thing
the contractual acceleration and foreclosure rights tell us is that Secured Creditor
A can foreclose and get $50.
But to answer the priority question we want to know what to do with the
additional $110 in surplus that is created by the bankruptcy process. And, herein,
lies the circularity problem with the entire priority debate. Bankruptcy is a noncontractual process by which creditors forbear on their enforcement rights, force
others to do the same, and facilitate a sale or reorganization that increases their
recovery. Bankruptcy law, in other words, is implementing a “hypothetical
bargain” that we might observe in a counterfactual universe with complete
contracts and no transaction costs. Conventional theories tell us that such a
hypothetical bargain will be the one that maximizes the surplus value of the
whole estate. But what does that bargain look like?
Nothing in existing debt contracts answers that question. These contracts
already assume the existence of a bankruptcy law that imposes a mandatory
bargain that may or may not be the optimal one.14 Thus, it is a non-sequitur to
argue that, simply because debt contracts contain acceleration clauses, any value
created by bankruptcy belongs to the senior creditors, or that the junior creditors’
options expire with the bankruptcy filing. Senior loan agreements may indeed
say these very things, but these agreements were drafted with the full knowledge
that these very things will never happen if a bankruptcy filing occurs. More
fundamentally, we have no way to know whether the counterfactual world with
complete contracts and no transaction costs would implement the bargain

13
14

This concept is discussed more fully in Casey supra at 770-78.
And, under plausible assumptions, is likely to be suboptimal. See Ayotte, supra.
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described in the debt contracts that we observe in a world with incomplete
contracts and high transaction costs.
Of course, the opposite claim is also fallacious. There is no theoretical
principle that tells us, as Jacoby and Janger suggest, that the going concern value
of a firm belongs to the junior creditors. Indeed, our central point in this chapter
is that the value does not belong to anyone and any attempt to correctly allocate it
is a fool’s errand. Instead, we focus on designing the most efficient
reorganization system with whatever priority scheme happens to go along with
it.15 In a sense, we are calling for a return to the first principles of the creditorsbargain theory. The priority rule that the parties would have bargained for is the
rule that maximizes the value of reorganization for the estate, and the parties are
“entitled” to whatever such a rule would provide them.16
1.2 What Happens to Options in Bankruptcy?
As noted, inside bankruptcy, contractual terms are replaced by a mandatory
process. In practice, this process forces parties to lobby the judge to protect their
The claim on the going concern value that is preserved though the bankruptcy process
is highly controversial. Some believe that the senior creditor’s lien on the firm covers
going concern value. Barry E. Adler and Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing
Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 Yale L. J. 83 (2001). Others argue that the going concern
value belongs to the junior creditors. Jacoby & Janger, supra. In reality, there is nothing
about the non-bankruptcy relationship between debtors and creditors that tells us
anything about who is entitled to going concern value. Casey supra. The most we can say
with certainty is that it belongs to whomever the bankruptcy code says it belongs to.
Similarly, those who claim that the parties have agreed that junior creditor’s option
expire upon the filing of bankruptcy have conflated bankruptcy’s mandatory rules with
the rights for which the parties have bargained. Id. at 766. Under the APR, bankruptcy
terminates the junior creditor’s option. But the relevant question is whether or not the
APR should do that. It is not a sufficient response to say that bankruptcy should
terminate the option because bankruptcy terminates the option.
16 Any objection that any single creditor is being underpaid, of course, goes away with
the well-rehearsed point that such a creditor can adjust its ex ante interest rate. See Alan
Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities:A Review of Current Theories, 10 J.
Legal. Stud. 1, 7-9 (1981); Thomas H. Jackson and Anthony J. Kronman, Secured
Financing and Priorities among Creditors,88 Yale L. J. 1143 (1979). Nonadjusting creditors
are another matter that do not fit well into the creditors’ bargain and may justify a
special carveout. But such creditors play a much smaller role in major corporate
reorganizations and are beyond the scope of this chapter.
15
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options. The lobbying is intense, and is the source of substantial deadweight loss,
because the bankruptcy code contains many rules that undermine or destroy
investors’ options outside bankruptcy.
Some of these rules have attracted attention. Scholars and policymakers have
focused recently on the effects of the APR, which treats the bankruptcy filing as a
common expiration date for all options. This tends to benefit senior lenders: If
the present value of the firm’s future cash flows (as measured in a sale or by a
judge in a reorganization) is less than the value of the senior claims, they receive
that present value. Junior interests are wiped out. If the firm’s value increases in
the future, even if it increases sufficiently to repay the senior debt in full, the
senior lenders keep the entire firm value. This occurs because the APR forces a
valuation of the firm at the filing date;17 subsequent volatility in firm value is
irrelevant. Contrast this with what happens outside bankruptcy. There, senior
lenders face asymmetric claims on the firm: When firm cash flows are low (lower
than debt service), senior lenders capture all flows. But when cash flows are high
(higher than debt service), senior lenders share these flows with junior investors.
That asymmetry (sharing the highs, but capturing the lows) is replaced with a
symmetry in bankruptcy (capturing the highs and the lows), which benefits the
senior lenders, induces costly strategic behavior by all creditors, and has
prompted various reform proposals.18
But this is only one of many ways that the bankruptcy code rewrites options.
For example, secured creditors hold an implicit real option in the event of
default, allowing them to choose between immediate recovery (via market-based
liquidation of collateral) or postponed realization (via debt restructuring).19
Many scholars have noted that this option is devalued by the code’s “adequate
protection” rules, which systematically undercompensate secured creditors for
the delay in payment caused by lengthy bankruptcy proceedings.20 The option is
In practice, though, valuation more often occurs at the confirmation date. On this dissonance
between doctrine and practice, see Douglas G. Baird, Secured Creditors’ Rights after Rescap, 2015
Ill. L. Rev. 849.
17

See, e.g., the ABI Commission Report. Scholars have advocated mechanisms for
protecting junior investors against the risk of judicial error in asset sales and in firm
valuation during the plan confirmation process. See Casey, supra (on the former); Jacoby
& Janger, supra (on the former); and Baird & Bernstein, supra (on the latter).
19 Robert K. Rasmussen, Secured Credit, Control Rights, and Options, 25 Cardozo L. Rev.
1935, 1941-50 (2004).
20 See, e.g., Douglas Baird, The Rights of Secured Creditors after ResCap, 2015 U. Ill. L. Rev.
849 (2015).
18
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further devalued by the judge’s role (and potential error) in computing the
amount of compensation payable to secured creditors as “adequate protection.”
Less obviously, the option can be destroyed (not merely devalued) by the
interplay of bankruptcy’s automatic stay, which prevents immediate liquidation,
and bankruptcy’s lien-stripping rules, which force the creditor to accept payment
equal to the current, judicially-appraised value of the collateral. To see this, begin
with the fundamental rule for valuing the claims of a secured creditor: The
creditor has a secured claim equal to the lesser of (a) the judge-determined value
of the collateral and (b) the debt owed to the creditor.21 This is called “lien
stripping” because the creditor’s lien is reduced to the current value of the
collateral if the total debt exceeds the collateral value. When lien stripping
occurs, the creditor receives an unsecured claim equal to the deficiency.
This process makes sense if the judicial valuation is derived from an auction
of the collateral.22 The process makes less sense if the collateral will be retained
pursuant to a plan of reorganization. In that case, the judge must first estimate
the collateral’s value. Then the secured creditor will receive either cash or a lien
plus a promise of future payments equal to the collateral’s judicially determined
value. This promise of future payment—where a new lien is crammed down on
the creditors—destroys option value. Indeed, the promise of payment is often
worth less—sometimes far less—than the present value of the collateral. This is
true even if the judge’s estimate is perfectly accurate in the sense that it pinpoints
the collateral’s present value.23
To illustrate, assume Debtor enters bankruptcy with $1,000 of unsecured debt
and $150 of secured debt. Secured Creditor has a lien on a key asset (perhaps the
debtor’s only asset) with uncertain value. There is an equal chance that the asset
will be worth $140 or $60 in the future. If it were sold at auction, the asset would
likely fetch its present value of $100. But Debtor plans to retain the asset
pursuant to a plan of reorganization, and it is the judge’s job—not the market’s—
Section 506(a) requires a judicial valuation: a creditor has a secured claim “to the
extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest” in the collateral.
22 When collateral is sold for cash at a well-conducted foreclosure or bankruptcy sale, the
lender receives a market estimate of the present value of that collateral. Assuming an
efficient market, the lender should be indifferent between a sale now and a sale in the
future.
23 This is not a problem if the reorganization plan will pay secured claims in cash in full
at confirmation; in that case, the creditor can invest the proceeds and capture
appreciation in the investment.
21
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to value the asset. Debtor proposes, and the judge confirms, a reorganization
plan that promises to pay the secured creditor $100 over time.24 Secured Creditor
also gets an unsecured deficiency claim, worth $50, but this claim has an
expected value near zero because it is severely diluted by the $1,000 owed to
unsecured creditors.25
Debtor’s promise to pay the $100 is, of course, not really worth $100. The
promise is risky. Suppose Debtor will honor this promise only if, postbankruptcy, the value of the asset is revealed to be $140. If the value of the asset
turns out to be only $60, Debtor will default with certainty. Assume that, if this
happens, the asset is sold at foreclosure and that Secured Creditor’s deficiency
claim ($40) is worthless.
Under these assumptions, even if the judge appraises the collateral at $100,
the expected value of Debtor’s promise is only $80. If the collateral rises in value
to $140, Debtor will pay only $100 to Secured Creditor (plus a trivial recovery on
account of its deficiency claim). If the collateral falls in value to $60, Secured
Creditor receives that amount from the foreclosure sale. Because these
outcomes—$100 and $60—occur with equal probability, Secured Creditor’s
expected recovery is $80. Thus, a combination of lien-stripping and the ability to
cram the new lien down on the lender forces secured claimants to receive less
than the market value of the collateral. If lien-stripping were forbidden, the
Secured Creditor in our hypothetical would receive $140 when the asset rises in
value and $60 when it falls. The expected recovery would be $100, the same
amount that the creditor expects from an immediate auction of the collateral.
The key problem, of course, is that the judge in our hypothetical is not
discounting the promised future payments at a rate that reflects the risk of
We are putting aside collateral valuation error, which generates the strategic behavior
studied by Adler. Barry E. Adler, Creditor Rights After Johnson and Dewsnup, 10 Bankr.
Dev. J. 1, 3-9 (1993/1994).
25 Here we are assuming a Debtor that resembles the typical firm we see in Chapter
11: Highly insolvent, with trivial expected recoveries to unsecured creditors even in the
best scenarios. The problems we document can disappear if the reorganization plan
gives Secured Creditor a continuing claim against the firm on account of its deficiency
claim, and if the payoff to this continuing claim is sufficiently high in good states of the
world that Secured Creditors is compensated for the losses it faces in bad states. Our
understanding is that these happy conditions rarely obtain, and indeed that senior
creditors don't always benefit from happy conditions (a plan can cash out the deficiency
claim for a small sum while giving equity to other unsecured creditors).
24
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default. Under existing law, a secured creditor can demand an interest rate that
compensates for this risk. But what interest rate would offer sufficient
compensation? The rate must ensure that the present value of Debtor’s future
payments is equal to the current value of the collateral ($100). There are two
potential outcomes in our case. One is that Debtor defaults and Secured Creditor
forecloses, recovering $60. The present value of that recovery is $30. Nothing can
be done to increase the foreclosure recovery. The other, equally likely outcome is
that Debtor honors its promise. How large should that promise be in order to
ensure that Secured Creditor receives $100 in present value? The answer is $140.
The present value of that promise—honored half of the time—is $70. If we sum
the creditor’s expected recoveries in both potential outcomes ($30 + $70), we
obtain a net present value equal to $100. If the time for repayment is one year,
this implies that the appropriate interest rate is 40%. As long as Debtor promises
to pay $100 plus 40% interest, Secured Creditor will receive deferred cash
payments with a present value equal to the current value of the collateral ($100).
The appropriate interest rate is therefore a rate that reverses lien stripping.26 At
a 40% interest rate, Secured Creditor is capturing the full future appreciation in
collateral value. This undoes the effects of lien stripping and provides the

In some cases, the interest rate would even raise the lien to a level higher than it was
before it was stripped. In practice, it is difficult to know whether a judge would apply a
discount rate that has this effect on lien stripping. As a matter of doctrine, the caselaw
instruct courts to apply a discount rate that includes an appropriate “risk adjustment”
or, if possible, to apply a rate that would be applied in market settings. See, e.g., Till v.
SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (a Chapter 13 case); In re Gramercy Twins Assoc.,
187 B.R. 112, 123-24 (Bankr. SDNY 1995) (Chapter 11 case); In re American HomePatient,
Inc., 420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005). But it seems unlikely that the risk adjustment will
be sufficient to compensate secured creditors for the risk of default. Not only is the
adjustment complex and controversial, but it appears that many courts favor an
adjustment equal between one and three percent (above the prime rate). Gary W. Marsh
& Matthew M. Weiss, Chapter 11 Interest Rates After Till, 84 Am. Bankr. L.J. 209, 231
(2010). This will be undercompensatory in many cases. See, e.g., Till, supra, at 488 (“The
dissent might be correct that the use of the prime rate, even with a small risk adjustment,
‘will systematically undercompensate secured creditors for the true risks of default.’ …
This systematic undercompensation might seem problematic as a matter of policy. But, it
raises no problem as a matter of statutory interpretation. Thus, although there is always
some risk of nonpayment when A promises to repay a debt to B through a stream of
payments over time rather than through an immediate lump-sum payment, §
1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) does not take this risk into account.”).
26
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creditor with a lien that is at or above the level of the original lien. Thus, any
bankruptcy code that is committed to the notion of lien stripping is also a regime
that systematically destroys the secured creditor’s non-bankruptcy option to
exercise foreclosure rights immediately and capture the full present value of the
collateral.27 This destruction is costly not only to the secured creditor, but can be
inefficient as well because it diverts value to junior classes.28 Although this
redistribution occurs ex post (during a bankruptcy), it will distort ex ante capital
structure decisions of borrowing corporations. As secured debt becomes more
expensive in response to the possibility of ex post redistribution, some firms may
find themselves unable to borrow (or borrow as much) on a secured basis. If
secured debt has efficiency properties, as many scholars hypothesize, these
distortions almost certainly bring costs.29

We can take steps to protect senior creditors’ options. One is the §1111(b) election,
which allows the creditor to give up its unsecured deficiency claim in exchange for a
secured claim that is equal to the value of the collateral but supported by a lien equal to
the original indebtedness. Even though the §1111(b) election increases the value of the
creditor’s lien it does not increase the real value of the payments required in a
cramdown. This is useful to a creditor only if the debtor defaults when the value of the
collateral has appreciated. Then the creditor can use the lien to capture that appreciation.
But the risk of default will be relatively low when collateral appreciates. The real danger
to a secured creditor is a default when collateral values have depreciated, and the
§1111(b) election does nothing to address that danger.
28 The inefficiency might be justified by other policies, such as preservation of viable
going-concerns. That policy could be invoked in situations in which multiple lenders
have liens against a single asset. These situations arise, for example, when a secured loan
has been securitized: multiple investors will have claims (with the same or differing
priority) against a single asset. Unless the intercreditor agreement has a collective action
clause or other device for creditor cooperation, a distressed debtor will face high or
prohibitive costs to negotiate a modification. Cramdown could have positive efficiency
effects in these multi-creditor situations. When a lien has been securitized, bankruptcy
law may be needed to solve the collective action problem that arises from competition
across multiple creditors. Some kind of agreement must be imposed on the creditors.
Cramdown can be seen as a simple solution with low administrative cost. In many
situations, however, there are only one or two liens against a piece of collateral and the
costs of negotiation are low. In these situations, the inefficiency of lien-stripping is high.
29 Suppose, for example, that secured debt serves as a commitment device for financially
weak firms that cannot otherwise convince investors to commit capital (e.g., by issuing
unsecured debt with financial covenants). The secured debt protects the lender against
the risk that the borrower will subsequently engage in conduct that reduces the lender’s
27
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2. Trading Off Options in Bankruptcy
The point of the foregoing discussion is to illustrate how the bankruptcy code
implicitly re-allocates option value between junior and senior investors. In our
view, any effort to protect junior investor options necessarily entails a reduction
in protection for senior investor options, and any effort to protect senior
investors will reduce the protection for junior investors. This trade off is inherent
in the nature of bankruptcy. A system that alters non-bankruptcy rights to
preserve value will, by definition, alter the rights and options of the various
stakeholders. To select one option for protection, as much of the literature does,
is to ignore the various other options and the dynamic interplay between them
all.
One reaction to this trade-off is to ignore it, or at least be unconcerned about
ex post reallocations of rights unless they create deadweight costs. It’s not
necessarily problematic that the bankruptcy process causes a significant
reallocation of value between junior and senior investors because the parties can
take steps ex ante to protect themselves. Junior investors can demand a higher
rate of return as compensation for any ex post diversion of value to senior
investors (and vice versa). The parties can also design capital structures that
minimize the need for bankruptcy and the extent of value diversion ex post.30

expected payment (“dilution”). See Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in
Bankruptcy, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1396 (1997), for a model along these lines. Lien-stripping
and cramdown, working in tandem, weaken the ability of secured debt to serve as a
commitment device because they expose secured creditors to “dilution” in bankruptcy.
In response, secured lenders may increase the price of secured credit. Assuming
borrowing firms know how likely they are to enter bankruptcy, but secured lenders
cannot verify this, “low-risk” firms will face a price of secured credit that is too high
relative to their risk level. Facing such a high price, these firms may not make
productive investments. That is inefficient. The inefficiency could be even more severe
in equilibrium. As low-risk firms drop out of the market, secured lenders will see a more
risky set of borrowers and therefore further increase the price of secured credit. A
lemons equilibrium could arise. Alternatively, a rationing equilibrium could result, with
secured lenders offering a low price but randomly loaning to only a subset of borrowers.
At such a low price, the applicant borrowers will include a mix of low-risk and high-risk
types. Randomly choosing from this group may be more profitable than charging a high
rate to only the high-risk types. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing
in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1981).
30 This is really just a restatement of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem. Franco Modigliani
and Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
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Under this view, the only ex-post reallocations that matter are those that
generate value destruction. Critics of the APR see the rule as just such a source of
value destruction. The rule announces a common expiration date for all options
and directs the bankruptcy judge to value the firm. Because everything hinges on
the judicial valuation, the parties jockey to avoid or exploit valuation variance. In
some cases, we get fire sales, induced by senior creditors seeking to avoid
variance in judicial valuations. In others, we get inefficiently drawn-out
reorganizations, induced by junior stakeholders seeking to exploit that variance.
When scholars and policymakers advocate a “relative priority” regime, they are
arguing for a regime that allocates options in a way that may reduce the risk of
fire-sales and drawn-out reorganizations.
In our view, this is only an indirect way to avoid fire sales and inefficient
reorganizations. It seems better, we think, to focus on the root problem: The
bankruptcy process is run by judges. If asset sales were timed to avoid fire sales, if
secured creditors were compensated fully for delay, and if asset valuations were
unbiased and had low (or no) variance, we wouldn’t care about what the
bankruptcy process does to the parties’ nonbankruptcy options. But assets can
fetch fire sale prices when judges are convinced to conduct premature sales. And
secured creditors can be undercompensated for delay when judges make errors
in computing adequate protection. And, of course, judicial valuations are errorprone and volatile. But if we had an automatic system, that minimized judicial
involvement, many of these problems would go away. Senior and junior
investors would be cashed out of their positions at market values. If doing so
destroys option value, the parties would make ex ante adjustments to their
contracts. The key is not the preservation of the rights of the stakeholders. The
key is the preservation of the value of the estate. These intuitions—that it is
impossible (and unnecessary) to protect all options in bankruptcy and that fire
sales and valuation are problems only when judges run the process—motivate
the following proposal for an automatic process that minimizes judicial
involvement.31

Investment, 48 Am Econ Rev 261, 268–71 (1958); see also Casey supra at 778-89
(exploring arguments why the Modigliani-Miller Theorem may or may not hold in this
context).
31 We are, of course, not the first to advocate a system that minimizes the role of the
judge. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. Legal
Stud. 127 (1986) and Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101
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3. An Automatic Process
We propose a restructuring process in which parties can elect ex post between
a regime of relative priority and one of absolute priority. Bankruptcy judges are
involved only if the parties invoke the absolute priority regime. The threat of a
judicial valuation, if it is indeed a threat, can induce the parties to restructure the
firm via a relative priority regime with minimal (or no) judicial oversight.
Although we cannot identify the optimal “hypothetical bargain” that would have
been struck by creditors and the debtor in a world with complete contracts and
no transaction costs, our proposal creates a process that allows the parties to
negotiate toward an optimal bargain while minimizing the costs (including
errors) of the judicial process.
Under our proposal, the firm’s senior creditors hold the option to restructure
the firm’s debt at any time after a contractually-defined default.32 If the
restructuring option is exercised, the firm must be sold as a going concern
immediately, as described below. If the option is not exercised, ordinary
bankruptcy rules apply but the firm cannot be sold in bankruptcy: The debtor is
either reorganized or liquidated piecemeal.33 Thus, our proposal can be seen as a
supplement to traditional bankruptcy law. It provides a new process for the
going-concern sale procedures (“363 Sales”) that have evolved over the last two
decades, but otherwise leaves bankruptcy law unchanged.
If the restructuring option is exercised, the senior lenders choose between two
types of going-concern sales:34 (i) a sale subject to warrants or (ii) a sale subject to
appraisal. The first type pays junior investors in full or distributes warrants
allowing them to capture future appreciation in the sold-off firm’s assets (“sale
subject to warrants”). There is little need for judicial oversight of this type of sale
process, though it would not be problematic to allow for high-level judicial
oversight of the bidding procedures. The problems generated by judicial error

Harv. L. Rev. 775 (1988). Our proposal departs from prior proposals like these because it
envisions a process that commences before bankruptcy.
32 We acknowledge that such a proposal would require either a change to state law
(likely through Article 9 of the UCC) or a much broader scope for the bankruptcy code.
33 The senior creditor could respond to a filing by exercising its restructuring option
within a certain time frame. That way, the debtor cannot threaten to use liquidation as a
means to thwart a going concern sale.
34 If a piecemeal liquidation is thought optimal, the firm should be liquidated in a
Chapter 7 or a traditional foreclosure proceeding, which our proposal would retain.
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arise not from procedural oversight, but rather from substantive decisionmaking. Our proposal eliminates the latter.
The other type of sale—“sale subject to appraisal”—is a process in which the
buyer takes the assets free and clear of investors’ claims, but the proceeds are
distributed to senior and junior investors after a judicial appraisal hearing. The
hearing would be similar to that used in conventional sale-of-control cases
outside of bankruptcy. If the sale price is lower than the appraised going-concern
value, senior investors must compensate juniors for the loss. A judge is therefore
involved in the appraisal hearing, not the sale (though, once again, there could
be a high-level role for hearing objections to egregious sale procedures).
By placing the restructuring option in the hands of senior lenders, our
proposal not only preserves their non-bankruptcy option to liquidate or offer
forbearance, but permits restructuring in advance of the kind of financial
meltdown that often precedes a bankruptcy filing. Although senior lenders retain
their non-bankruptcy option to accelerate the indebtedness, the payoffs from
exercising that restructuring option—a sale subject to warrants or a sale subject
to appraisal—are designed to reduce the risk of fire sales that harm junior
investors.
Suppose, for example, that senior lenders are considering whether to exercise
the restructuring option. If they opt for a sale subject to warrants, the price paid
by the buyer will be discounted by the value of those warrants. Senior investors,
in other words, must pay a premium to engage in a fire sale. They give up their
absolute priority rights and transfer the option value to the junior creditors in the
form of warrants. This translates to a reduction in the price that a buyer is willing
to pay. Because the juniors are retaining their option value and thus getting the
same as they would under a full reorganization, the senior creditors bear the full
cost of a fire sale. Every dollar of discount in the value of the firm relative to a
full reorganization is borne by the senior creditors, forcing them to internalize
fully the cost of the sale.35
Alternatively, senior investors can opt for a sale subject to appraisal. This
preserves absolute priority. Here too, however, senior creditors can expect to pay
compensation to juniors if the judge determines that the sale price was below the
going-concern value of the firm. Because seniors must compensate juniors after

See Casey, supra (modeling out the creditors incentives in a fire sale subject to
warrants).
35
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the fact, it will be unattractive to exercise the restructuring option when it
exposes the firm to a fire sale.
If the sale is subject to warrants, these securities should entitle junior
investors to buy the firm’s assets at a price equal to the value of the senior
investors’ claims, regardless of the purchase price. The warrants would have a
long duration, perhaps 5 or 10 years or perhaps they could be perpetual. This
effectively preserves the junior investors’ non-bankruptcy call option. If the sale
price is below the seniors’ claim, the buyer captures any appreciation up to the
value of the seniors’ claim. Further appreciation can be enjoyed by the buyer
only after buying the juniors’ warrants. In this way, the warrants permit a twostep sale: When the seniors exercise their restructuring option, the firm is sold
subject to warrants (step 1). Later, the buyer can obtain full ownership of the firm
by buying the juniors’ warrants (step 2).
Of course some may argue that the warrants create a governance problem.
The firm is sold to a new owner who has control but does not hold the rights to
residual value of the firm. This introduces agency costs where ownership and
control are separated.36 It is likely that this problem will loom large for some
companies, but not others. The more out-of-the-money the warrants are, the less
the buyer should care that the warrants exist, especially if the volatility of asset
value is low.
But the appraisal option addresses this problem. When agency costs are
expected to be large, senior lenders will be more likely to favor a sale subject to
appraisal. This choice places a cap on the costs that the warrants can impose. If
the agency costs exceed the cost of appraisal, they won’t be incurred.
On the other side of the equation, our proposal mitigates key problems under
current law—appraisal variance and junior creditors taking advantage of judicial
error. Because senior lenders choose which cases go to appraisal, the choice to
invoke the procedure is taken out of the hands of those who have the incentive to
exploit judicial error. And because the senior lender has the option to skip
appraisal by using warrants, we place a ceiling on the harm caused by judicial
error and valuation variance. When error is likely or when judicial valuation is
expected to have high variance, the senior creditors will opt for a sale subject to
warrants.

See Casey supra, at 805 (discussing the possible agency costs introduced by granting
non expiring options to junior investors).
36
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One might object that where the warrants introduce high costs and variance
from judicial error is high, the senior lenders will find themselves stuck between
a rock and a hard place. A sale subject to warrants is costly, but a sale subject to
appraisal is vulnerable to judicial error. This dilemma may induce senior lenders
to opt for a traditional reorganization rather than a sale. That is true. But it may
be a good thing. Cases where assets are so volatile that out-of-the-money
warrants might actually pay out (otherwise a buyer wouldn’t care) and where a
judge’s valuation is expected to have high variance are also the cases most likely
to result in a fire sale if the assets are sold off. The value of those firms, both to
the market and to judges is highly uncertain or highly volatile. The higher the
volatility of an asset, the more likely a senior creditor will want to sell cheap and
reduce its risk at the cost of the junior creditors. Put another way, when a senior
creditor is particularly worried that both the market and the judge think that the
firm is likely to be worth more than the senior debt, there may be good reason to
think that the firm is in fact likely to be worth more than the senior debt.
In all of this it should be noted that a sale without appraisal requires the
senior creditor to forgo its APR rights. This is likely a significant cost to the
creditor. But it is the price that a creditor would pay to avoid judicial valuation.
In that way, it places an outer-bound on the distortions that can be imposed by
valuation. Thus, our proposal both reduces the variance of judicial involvement
by permitting an after-the-fact appraisal hearing and gives creditors an escape
valve for cases where that variance remains significant. The senior creditor then
gets to choose the lesser of the evils that are necessary to avoid fire sales.
Our “automatic procedure” resembles Adler’s “chameleon equity” proposal
(and “bail-in,” more generally) because a restructuring occurs without judicial
intervention. It also resembles the proposals of Casey as well as Jacoby and
Janger because the senior investors must compensate juniors for fire sales. Our
procedure differs from prior proposals because it puts decision-making authority
in the hands of senior investors. Whereas most prior work advocates limiting the
power of senior lenders, ours would increase it in order to leverage the
informational advantages of senior investors. Additionally, unlike prior
proposals, ours integrates an out-of-court procedure (sale subject to warrants)
with a judicial appraisal (sale subject to appraisal). The judicial appraisal, which
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is central to the Jacoby and Janger proposal, is invoked here to function as a
threat-point for the out-of-court restructuring.37

One other feature that many have highlighted in the Jacoby and Janger proposal is the
requirement that the senior creditors post a bond. This bond is, in our view, of little
consequence because senior creditors are unlikely to be judgment proof even without
the bonds.
37
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